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RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE
By KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A.B., LL.D.*
Some Notable Cases
The law student who is called upon to define legal residence or
domicile should proceed with caution for not a few eminent
authorities have declared that it "can't be done." Possibly a
hundred cases can be found where courts have said that residence
and domicile were synonymous and a much larger number can
be produced in which that proposition is denied. But this curious
contradiction is more apparent than real for it will be found on
examination that in the first class of cases the particular circum-
stances justified the statement as applied to that state of facts but
afforded no basis for a general assertion.
One cause of the confusion as to the meaning of these words is
found in the fact that the statutes of most of the states refer to
residence and have nothing to say about domicile; but when a case
reaches the court, the judges and lawyers talk about domicile,
and a question immediately arises as to whether the legislature
which framed the law had in mind residence as the equivalent of
domicile or just plain, every-day residence in its popular sense
of mere physical presence in a place for a longer or shorter period
of time.
If we may be permitted to. visualize the concepts embodied in
residence and domicile we can think of Residence as a giddy
young thing gallivanting around the world in various garbs and
even performing the unique feat of being in several places at the
same moment of time, while Domicile, her staid and respectable
mother-in-law, remains at home in an austere attempt to preserve
the respectability of the family. The distressing feature of the
situation, however, is that when Residence is not at home, Domi-
cile becomes a subject of grave suspicion and her standing in
good (legal) circles is seriously jeopardized. Residence is a mis-
chievous sprite and can easily assume all the habiliments and
attributes of Domicile, but in order to do this successfully (and
legally) she has to form a temporary alliance with a somewhat
visionary and vacillating character known as "Intent-to-remain"
*Member of the Milwaukee Bar and the author of Income Taxation.
He is engaged in the preparation of a treatise on Residence and Domicile.
Contributor of "Tax Titles Upon Which the Three-Year Statute of Limita-
tions Has Not Run" in 2 MARQUE=rE LAw RmEIEw, 85, and "Tax Titles,
Upon Which the Three-Year Statute of Limitation Has Run" in 2
MARQiuErTE LAw REViEw, 124.
RESIDENCE. AND DOMICILE
or Animus Manendi. Whether or not this alliance is made in
good faith is a question which has given the corts much concern,
and some of the curious situations which arise in connection with
it are illustrated in the following decisions.
A Peculiar Case
One of the most novel cases which has ever arisen in respect
to residence is found in the Income Tax Decisions (of England),
Volume 5, on page 667. It appears by the evidence (taken in
1911) that one Bayard Brown, an American citizen, purchased a
rather large steam yacht in May, 1889. After cruising in this
yacht a few weeks he anchored it in the estuary of the River
Colne, which was within the jurisdiction of Colchester in the
county of Essex, England. The only village within several niles
where provisions could be procured was Brightlingsea, and it is
refreshing to know that among the provisions and necessaries
there was included an ample stock of "spirits and wines required
by the appellant for the use of himself and his crew and any
other persons who might happen to come on board." The Ameri-
can flag was flown at the mast at all times. The yacht was in tide
water and was manned by a crew of eighteen men who kept it in
readiness to be used at any moment.
So far there was nothing very remarkable about the circum-
stances, but our credulity is- tested when we learn from the evi-
dence that these conditions were maintained for over twenty
years, the owner of the yacht living there with his crew of eight-
een men who observed the regular ship discipline as to watches,
care of machinery, etc., both owner and .crew apparently quite
content with their situation. In 19o9 Mr. Brown was notified of
an assessment of income tax made against him of 1ioooO, from
which assessment he appealed. It was argued on his behalf that
he was an American citizen; that the yacht was an American
ship and could not be a British ship for it is illegal for a foreigner
to own a British ship; that Mr. Brown had the right to enter any
harbor of the United Kingdom and that there was no law limiting
the period for which he could remain there..
The King's counsel, in answer to the suggestion that the yacht
was kept at all times ready to go to sea, replied, "Yes, but it does
not go," and further that it did not make any difference that a
man's house was not a house which stood by the action of gravity
upon land, but happened to be a house supported by the action of
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buoyancy upon water. Another point made in behalf of Mr.
Brown was that: "This ship flying the American flag, being
owned by an American citizen, not being on the British Register,
is really to all intents and purposes a portion of American terri-
tory and therefore not part of this realm, and not a place which
can be contemplated by the owner of the ship as being his resi-
dence in the sense of a residence in England."
The Master of the Rolls and two Lord Justices disposed of the
cage very briefly by dismissing the appeal. While we have no
information as to what happened next, we can easily imagine that
the elaborate preparations for going to sea, which had extended
over a period of twenty years, were made use of and a more hos-
pitable haven was sought.
An Earlv Case
One of the first (if not the very first) cases upon the subject
of residence in the United States is that of Guier v. O'Daniel,
found in a note to Desesbats v. Berguier, i Binney (Pa.) 336, 349.
This case arose in the Orphan's Court in the city and county of
Philadelphia and was decided on July 7, I8o6. The amount in-
volved was $I,4OO.OO and it appeared that Thomas Guier was the
captain of a vessel and was murdered in the West Indies in i8ot.
The money in controversy was part of the proceeds of certain
coffee which came to Philadelphia and was sold on his account
after his death. O'Daniel claimed it for his brothers and sisters
by the law of Delaware and the father claimed it for himself by
the law of Pennsylvania. The question at issue, therefore, was
as to whether Thomas Guier was or was not a resident of Wil-
mington, Del. The facts which were developed at the trial
showed that his father, who had previously lived in Connecticut,
removed to Wilmington in 1795 and became domiciled at the
latter place where Thomas studied navigation. In March, 1797,
the son took a so-called "protection" from the Collector of Phila-
delphia and sailed from that port. Most of his voyages were
made from Wilmington. It is rather curious that the attorney
for the father took the somewhat untenable grounds:
i. That Thomas Guier had no domicile anywhere.
2. That where there is no domicile of preference, custom and
the law of Pennsylvania established the lex loci rei sita' as the rule
of succession to personal as well as to real property.
3. That the locus rei sitcr being Pennsylvania, and no domicile
of preference being shown eleswhere, by the law of Pennsylvania
the father was entitled to the succession.
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The decision of President Rush in this case is interesting as
containing the first definition of domicile found in our reports.
He defines it as "a residence at a particular place accompanied
by positive or presumptive proof of continuing it an unlimited
length of time." This definition probably forms the basis for the
one adopted by Story which has been quoted in court so many
times, both in this country and England. A well-known writer
has referred to it as "the most exact definition which has been
given" (Calvo, in his Manuel de Droit Ift. Pub. et Priv. Sec. 197).
The court held that Thomas Guier was domiciled in the state of
Delaware during pupilage and after he became sui juris and held
that any personal property must be distributed according to the
law of the state of Delaware. The somewhat rhetorical flourish
with which the decision ends has been often quoted and will, per-
haps, bear repetition:
"The sailor who spends whole years in combating the winds
and waves, and the contented husbandman whose devious steps
seldom pass the limits of his farm, may in their different walks
of life, exhibit equal evidence of being domiciled in a country.
Every crcumstance in the conduct of old, Guier and his son
Thomas, taking into view the unsettled mode of life of the latter,
affords the fullest proof that they were both domiciled in Dela-
ware. If the proof be str9nger in either case, it is in the case of
Thomas, who, though employed in traversing the globe from clime
to clime, constantly returned to Wilmington, the source and
center of his business, the seat and abode of his friends and con-
nexions. His 'heart untravelled' appears to have been immovably
fixed on the spot, to which he was attached by the powerful tie of
interest, and the strongest obligations of social duty; and never
for a moment to have pointed a wish to any other country."
A Hard Case
What shall be said of a man who appears to have devoted his
life to making up as puzzling a case of residence as possible? We
refer to the case of White v. Brown, i Wall. Jr. 217; Fed. Cas.
17538.
In submitting the case to the jury, Judge Grier said: "There
are few subjects presented to courts for their decision which
are surrounded with so many practical difficulties as questions of
domicile. The residence is often of an equivocal nature; the
intention extremely obscure, and has to be gathered from acts and
declarations oftentimes conflicting and contradictory. It is prob-
able, however, that there is not a case to be found in all the books
which presents more difficulties arising from this cause than the
one before us. The testimony fills an 8vo.. volume of nearly 9oo
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pages. You have the whole history of the life of Matthias
Aspden, all that he did, much that he said, and much more that he
has written. Indeed it would seem, that being a man of much
leisure he had spent a great part of his life writing documents
which bear-some indirectly, and many directly-upon the very
question which you are called on to decide. And now with an
obliquity of genius rarely exceeded, he has enveloped it in so
much contradiction and confusion and obscurity that it will re-
quire your utmost attention and the vigorous exercise of all
your powers to solve the question."
Any attempt to summarize the facts of this case within a small
compass would be futile. The case arose on a feigned issue which
presented the following questions:
(i) "Where was the domicile of origin of the testator?
(2) Where was his domicile at the time of his making his will,
December 6, 179 1?
(3) Where was it at the time of his death, August 9, 1824?
(4) Where was it during the intermediate time: i. e., between
December 6, 1791 and August 9, 1824?"
The father of the testator came from England to America in
1718, and the testator himself, Matthias Aspden, was born in
Philadelphia in 1748. It should be noted that at that time and
for many years afterward Pennsylvania was a British province.
In 1760 the testator was taken to England by his father and put
into an English school. It does not appear how long he remained
in England but in 1764 the father made his will at Philadelphia
appointing his son one of the executors and died there the follow-
ing year. In 1766 he went again to England for a period of about
one year and in 1768 or 1769 established himself in trade with a
half-brother. Although there is every evidence that he was an
eccentric person, a hypochondriac, and apparently of almost un-
balanced mind in his later years, he showed unusual shrewdness
in money matters and accumulated a large fortune.
One of his ships having been seized in England, in 1775 he re-
solved to go to England to recover it. He did not make the voy-
age then but sent over all his vessels and sold them in England.
In March, 1776, he sold much of his real estate, left a general
power of attorney to manage and dispose of his affairs, and also
drew a will, and in all of these papers described himself as "of
Philadelphia, merchant." He left Philadelphia about the middle
of September some days before Pennsylvania came into exist-
ence as a state. and before it was possible for him to owe any
allegiance to it as a state. In 178o a proclamation was issued
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against him by the state of Pennsylvania requiring him to appear
by April 1, 1781, to answer a charge of treason. This time was
extended nine months and upon his failure to appear he was de-
clared a traitor and all his real estate which he had not sold was
confiscated. He applied to the British Government for compen-
sation for his losses on the ground that he had been a local Brit-
ish subject.
Afterwards, in 1785, he came to Pennsylvania in an endeavor
to get his property restored to him, but he remained in this state
only ten days when he returned to England. He spent the greater
portion of his life from that time on in an effort to get satis-
sation for his losses on the ground that he had been a local Brit-
this country and as an Englishman while in England.
In March, i79o, he made preparations for going to the United
States and before leaving London, executed a will which he left
there in which he requested, among other things, that his body
be buried in Lancastershire. On December 9, 1791, he made
another will, leaving his estate, which by that time amounted to
about half a million dollars, to his heirs at law and appointing
three American executors. He died August 9, 1824, at lodgings
in London at the age of seventy-six, having spent about forty-
eight years in England as against twenty-eight years in America.
It only remains to be said that the jury, after having been out for
twenty-four hours, found a verdict in favor of the American
domicile on each of the dates mentioned in the issues.
It is a peculiar fact that even people much in the public eye
can have a doubtful residence. As examples of this we might
mention Mrs. Hetty H. R. Green (In re Green's Est., 164 N. Y.
Supp. 1o63.), Mary Garden (Protest i88, 388 Treas. Dec. 30270,
G. A. 6965, Jan. 30, i91o), Gen. Frederick Dent Grant (In re
Grant, 83 Misc. (N. Y.) 257; 144 N. Y. Supp. 576), and John D.
Rockefeller (Rockefeller v O'Brien, 224 Fed Rep. 54). There
are many strange and even romantic cases which arise in connec-
tion with the question of residence, but they will have to be re-
served for some future article.
